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The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court in Canada and the 
United States: Confused Agendas and Compromised 
Assessment Procedures
Stephanie R. Penney and Marlene M. Moretti
This article traces the evolution of the youth justice system in Canada and the United States and examines 
the practice of transferring juveniles to criminal court. Experts disagree about whether the goals of 
rehabilitation and retribution can be satisfactorily reconciled within the bounds of the juvenile system, and 
whether juvenile transfer significantly deters youth crime. Equally controversial is the appropriateness of 
exposing youth – who are in the midst of development – to the criminal system and to the possibility of 
receiving a lengthy adult sanction. We argue that it is neither efficacious nor ethical to transfer youth to 
adult court and deny them the protections afforded by the juvenile system. Concepts from developmental 
psychology, risk assessment, and juvenile psychopathy are integrated into this argument. Recommendations 
for policy and future research are noted, including a need to develop systematic guidelines that bridge legal 
and psychosocial constructs in the assessment of risk, amenability to treatment, and maturity of character in 
youth.
Juvenile offenders are criminals who happen
to be young, not children who happen to be
criminal. (Regnery, 1985, p. 65)
America is now home to thickening ranks
of juvenile “super-predators”—radically
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters,
including ever more preteenage boys, who
murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal
deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and
create serious communal disorders. They do
not fear the stigma of arrest, the pains of
imprisonment, or the pangs of conscious-
ness. (Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996, p.
27)
As the above quotes emphasize, there is an
alarmist and “get tough” quality to current policy
making, research, and public sentiment towards
violent crime among juveniles (Allard, 2000;
Halikias, 2000; National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, 1991; Sprott, 2001; Wu, 2000). The
media’s selective focus on incidences of extreme
violence committed by young persons has likely
distorted the public’s perception of youth crime and
fuelled a punitive attitude towards it. In contrast to
the media’s sensational—and often inaccurate—
portrayal of youth violence, recent statistics
concerning juvenile crime present a more balanced
picture. In Canada, for instance, serious youth
violence has been consistent for the past three
decades (Bromwich, 2002; Sprott, 2001). Ironically,
those offenses—homicide, aggravated, and sexual
assaults, for example—that cause the most public
anxiety and outrage are precisely the ones that
evidence the most stability. From an American
perspective, societal concerns about youth violence
may be more justified. A 50% increase in total
juvenile arrests for violent crimes occurred between
1988 and 1994 in the United States, coupled with a
5% increase in the proportion of violent crimes
cleared (Howell, Krisberg, & Jones, 1995; Snyder,
Sickmund, & Poe-Yamagata, 1996). Furthermore,
the U.S. witnessed a dramatic increase in the number
of people under the age of 18 arrested for murder:
158% between 1985 and 1994 (Children’s Defense
Fund, 1997). More recently, however, juvenile arrests
for violent crimes in the U.S. have been noted to be
at their lowest level since 1988. In 2000, law
enforcement agencies in the U.S. made an estimated
2.4 million arrests of persons younger than 18, a 15%
drop from 1996. For violent offending in particular,
between 1996 and 2000 juvenile arrests for Violent
Crime Index offenses (including murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault) dropped 23%, while adult
arrests for these offenses dropped 9%. During this
period, juvenile arrests declined 55% for murder,
28% for weapons law violations, and 38% for
robbery (Snyder, 2003). Despite these decreases, the
rate of violent offending among American youth
continues to be substantially higher than the
corresponding rate in Canada. Moreover, the
American public continues to rate juvenile crime as
one of its most pressing social concerns (Walker,
1998; Wu, 2000).
The fact that children are more likely to be the
victims of violence than they are to be arrested for a
violent crime should be used to temper sensationalist
media depictions of youth violence. For instance,
by the time an American youth reaches 17 years of
age, he or she has a 1 in 9 chance of suffering from
posttraumatic stress disorder as the result of
witnessing or experiencing violent episodes in their
past (Osofsky, 2001). Youth are also more likely to
die by their own hand than at the hand of another
young person (Children’s Defense Fund, 1997;
Halikias, 2000). Yet there continues to be an
overwhelming opinion among citizens and politi-
cians alike that “youth violence is one of the most
serious problems confronting American society
today” (Thornberry, Huizinga, & Loeber, 1995, p.
213). Accordingly, public sympathy for young
delinquents has waned considerably over the past
decade. Tragedies such as the ones in Littleton,
Colorado and Taber, Alberta have simultaneously
amplified public fear of its young while toughening
its attitude towards youth violence.
The change in public sentiment is echoed in
various legislative reforms that have modified
juvenile law over the past 30 years in North America.
During the last three decades, laws have been passed
in Canada and the U.S. reflecting the public’s desire
to “get tough” on juvenile crime and hold young
offenders accountable for their behavior. Perhaps the
most salient of these reforms are those surrounding
the process of juvenile transfer. As Ruddell, Mays,
and Giever (1998) have noted, “the transfer of youths
to adult court—also defined as waiver, certification,
or remand—represents the cornerstone of a
contemporary get-tough movement directed at
juvenile offenders” (p. 2). Particularly true of the
American juvenile system, it is now easier, quicker,
and cheaper to have juveniles waived to adult
criminal court than ever before (Dawson, 2000;
Mulford, Reppucci, Mulvey, Woolard, & Portwood,
2004; Redding, 2003; Ullman, 2000). The legislative
surge toward limiting the jurisdiction of the juvenile
system reflects the strong public perception of the
inadequacy and disproportionality of the penal
sanctions available to juvenile courts. However, what
has been lost in these legislative reforms is a concept
of proportionality that gives due weight to develop-
mental factors such as intellectual or emotional
immaturity—factors that are directly relevant to the
culpability and blameworthiness of a young offender.
Developmental considerations are often glossed over
when the focus is on retribution and the losses of
life and limb sustained by the victims of juvenile
violence (Fagan & Zimring, 2000; Scott, 2002).
This article sketches a historical timeline of the
juvenile justice system in both Canada and the U.S.
to highlight the move that both countries have made
towards increasingly punitive youth justice policies.
Transfer laws and practices essentially embody a
punitive and utilitarian approach to youth justice;
accordingly, the mechanisms through which youth
may be transferred to adult court are critically
examined in terms of their efficacy in reducing
juvenile offending as well as their ethicality from a
developmental perspective. Criteria and methods
employed in conducting transfer assessments are
outlined to underscore the tension that exists between
what information forensic psychologists can reliably
offer the courts concerning individual youth, and
what the law requires from these evaluators on a
regular basis. Finally, the concept of juvenile
psychopathy is used as a specific example to
illuminate the difficulties involved in juvenile
transfer evaluations, and to highlight the problems
that are incurred when assumptions taken from adult
measures of psychopathology are extended to youth.
From a legal perspective, the construct of juvenile
psychopathy runs the risk of being misused,
particularly in the domain of transfer hearings,
because of the information it purports to offer
regarding a youth’s level of dangerousness,
amenability to rehabilitation, and criminal sophisti-
cation. Finally, recommendations and suggestions for
future research are outlined in light of these issues.
HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The juvenile justice system in the United States
recently celebrated its 100th anniversary. The first
special system of justice for juveniles in the U.S.
was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899;
within 30 years almost all of the other states had
created their own system for juveniles based on this
original model. Although a separate system for
juveniles has been in place in the U.S. for over a
century, the nature, goals, and purposes of this system
have changed radically since its inception. Similarly,
the Canadian juvenile justice system has undergone
major reforms in the past century that have had
significant repercussions on the way juvenile
offenders are dealt with and processed through the
system. Before providing a more detailed description,
however, of the various phases through which the
juvenile justice system has passed since its inception,
a broader statement might be useful here. Moving
away from rehabilitative and treatment-oriented
objectives, punishment, retribution, and public safety
have increasingly come to define the goals of the
Canadian and American juvenile justice systems. The
reasons for such a shift in focus will be elaborated
below, but for now it will suffice to say that the
juvenile justice system of today bears few resem-
blances to the original model created in Cook County
over 100 years ago.
Phase I of the Juvenile Justice System
In the early 19th century, before a separate
system of justice for youth was created, juvenile
delinquents were treated no different from adult
criminals (Trepanier, 1999; Ullman, 2000). In
Canada, young offenders were subject to the same
laws and penal treatments as adults until 1857, after
which Parliament enacted legislation which
recognized the unique status of juveniles under the
law (Trepanier, 1999). Prior to this, youths deemed
to be “wayward” were incarcerated along with adult
criminals and exposed to harsh prison conditions.
This state of affairs was quickly discovered to be
untenable, as delinquent youths would become
educated in the “art” of organized crime by the adult
convicts to whom they were exposed. Moreover,
adult inmates would frequently abuse and exploit
youths that entered the institution. These youths
would often leave adult prisons more hardened and
entrenched in criminality than when they entered.
An indirect consequence of treating adolescent
offenders as adults, therefore, was that juvenile crime
continued to rise (Ullman, 2000).
Phase II: Progressivism & Parens Patriae
The latter portion of the 19th century witnessed
both large-scale societal changes as well as a surge
in psychological empiricism that led to a completely
novel conceptualization of the juvenile delinquent
(Grisso, 2003; Ullman, 2000). The Progressive
movement in the U.S., which emerged in response
to the deleterious effects that rapid industrialization
and urbanization were having on the country,
challenged the classic assumption that criminal
behavior was the product of a person’s free will and
therefore represented something deviant within the
individual. The central tenet behind the Progressive
movement, namely that “antecedent causal variables
produce crime and deviance” (Feld, 1987, p. 475),
set the stage for delinquent children to be viewed as
products of a corrupt environment rather than as
having an innate proclivity to crime and criminality.
The separation of adult and adolescent offenders was
deemed essential, since, according to the Progressive
view, exposing youths to the exploitative and corrupt
nature of the adult corrections system would only
serve to exacerbate their condition.
Knowledge coming from the field of child and
adolescent psychology helped bolster the claims that
were being made by the Progressives at this time.
Developmental scientists advanced the notion that
children and adolescents were fundamentally
different from adult offenders and deserved disparate
treatment under the law (Steinberg & Cauffman,
2000). Developmental psychology, although still in
its infancy at this time, started to defend the position
that, due to factors such as intellectual and emotional
immaturity, juvenile offenders could not be
considered responsible for their acts in the same way
as were adult criminals. Additionally, the study of
child development introduced the concept of
malleability, and stated that young offenders were
to be regarded as substantially more impressionable
and amenable to intervention than were their adult
counterparts (Grisso, 2003; Halikias, 2000; Steinberg
& Cauffman, 2000). Because adolescents were still
in the process of developing, society was seen as
having a responsibility to affect that developmental
process in positive and constructive ways (Platt,
1977). It was acknowledged that juveniles needed
to be placed in rehabilitative settings where they
would not be exposed to the kind of environmental
destabilizers that would promote a lifelong career
of criminal offending. The Progressive era thus
prompted the creation of a distinct system of justice
designed to treat and rehabilitate young offenders
(Tanenhaus, 2002; Ullman, 2000).
The development of a Canadian system of
juvenile justice emulated many trends that were
emerging in the U.S. Beginning in the later half of
the 19th century, many Canadian cities began
creating rehabilitative and reform institutions
designed specifically for delinquent, abused, and
neglected children. Policy recommendations were
put forth regarding delinquent youth, many of which
would later become formalized in the 1908 Juvenile
Delinquents Act (JDA, 1908). Canadian legislators
urged for the separation of adult and young offenders,
and separate detention facilities were eventually
created for juveniles, as were special courthouses
where young offenders could remain sheltered from
the public eye. This early Canadian model of juvenile
justice was progressive in that treatment objectives
and societal protection were not presented as
mutually exclusive or conflicting goals. In contrast
to current models of juvenile justice, the treatment
of juvenile delinquents was expressly regarded as a
means of achieving greater societal protection
(Trepanier, 1999).
The Juvenile Delinquents Act of 1970 continued
to be largely paternalistic and treatment-oriented in
nature. Similar in flavor to the Progressive era in the
U.S., the JDA was dedicated to understanding the
causes of delinquency and tailoring treatment
programs to the needs of the youth (Bala, 1989).
Under the JDA, it was relatively uncommon for
young offenders to receive lengthy custodial
dispositions, and waiver to adult court was strictly
reserved for those youth who committed the most
violent or serious offenses. The wording of the
transfer “test” used by the courts during this time is
reflective of the priorities set out in the Act. When
deciding whether to transfer a youth, the JDA placed
a premium on “the good of the child” and had as a
secondary objective “the interests of the community.”
Of note, these priorities were reversed in 1984 when
the JDA was repealed and the Young Offenders Act
(YOA, 1985) came into existence. In contrast to the
JDA, the YOA had as its primary criteria for transfer
“the interests of society” and second, “having regard
to the needs of the young person” (YOA, 1985, s.
16; Bala, 1989).
Treatment objectives took precedence over
questions of guilt, retribution, and culpability in this
emerging system of juvenile justice. In the U.S., the
Progressive movement gave way to the legal doctrine
of parens patriae, which is literally translated to
mean “father of the country.” Under this doctrine,
the state is viewed as the guardian of its delinquent
youth, and youth court judges were instructed to
discipline these youths in much the same way as they
would their own children (Tanenhaus, 2002; Ullman,
2000). Similarly, Canadian policy acknowledged that
the legal doctrines of proportionality and accounta-
bility did not have much relevancy as the goal was
not to punish young offenders; rather, the system
aimed to treat young offenders in order to prevent
future delinquency (Trepanier, 1999). Juvenile
proceedings were distinguished from adult trials in
that youths were not “sentenced” according to the
severity of their offenses but rather “adjudicated”
based solely on their unique developmental needs.
A major consequence of these new priorities was
that juvenile court judges were given broad flexibility
and discretion in addressing delinquent behavior.
Youth appearing in these courtrooms were often
deprived of the typical due process protections
afforded to adult defendants (Siegel & Sienna, 1981;
Trepanier, 1999; Ullman, 2000). Perhaps inevitably,
it was not long before critics of the juvenile system
emerged, noting how the non-adversarial nature of
juvenile proceedings violated the constitutional
rights of these youth (Yekel, 1997). The concept of
parens patriae was eventually rejected by the
juvenile courts as “murky and of dubious historical
relevance” (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999, p. 90), and
it was increasingly acknowledged that juveniles
needed to be provided with the same due process
rights in court as were adult defendants. The growing
dissatisfaction with the system, coupled with an
increasing crime rate among juveniles, set the stage
for the next phase juvenile justice to take shape.
Phase III: Punishment & Retribution
Legal commentators writing in the 1980s and
90s, reacting primarily to the public’s growing fear
of juvenile violence, reflected on the failure of the
rehabilitative system set up by the Progressives some
50 years earlier. In fact, the suspicion that the
rehabilitative system was floundering could be seen
as early as the 1960s. Critics of the system began to
point out that youths were not being successfully
treated within the system. Furthermore, it was noted
that adjudicating delinquents often resulted in
outcomes that resembled criminal sentences and
entailed significant intrusion into the lives and
liberties of affected youth (Grisso, 2000; Melton,
Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997). This is perhaps
what led Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in Kent
v. United States (1966), to conclude, “juveniles may
be receiving the worst of both worlds … neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the care and
treatment postulated for children” (p. 556). It was
formally acknowledged in Kent that the non-
adversarial nature of the juvenile system violated the
constitutional rights of young defendants. Conse-
quently, in 1966 the Supreme Court held for the first
time that juvenile defendants were entitled to due
process and representation by counsel. Another
significant outcome of the Kent decision was that it
instituted explicit criteria to be considered in waiver
hearings. Although juvenile courts often exercise
broad discretion in making transfer decisions, in most
jurisdictions judges draw upon some combination
of the original criteria set out in Kent (Ewing, 1990).
To date, these factors (i.e., dangerousness, amena-
bility to rehabilitation, sophistication and maturity)
continue to be weighted heavily in transfer decisions
(Ewing, 1990). Other aspects such as the youth’s age,
his or her prior record, and the degree of violence
and premeditation of the offense are often given
consideration as well.
In 1967, one year after Kent, the Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Gault reaffirmed the
application of due process requirements to juvenile
proceedings (Ullman, 2000). The Court held that
because a juvenile proceeding has the potential to
result in loss of liberty and is, in fact, comparable in
nature to an adult felony proceeding, a youth should
benefit from the expertise of counsel. The Gault
decision also served to shift judicial attention towards
a determination of guilt, thereby introducing
punishment-oriented remedies into the juvenile
system. Effectively, together with the Kent case, the
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault (1967)
transformed the structure and processes of the
juvenile court, and substantially diminished its
rehabilitative outlook by implementing due process
requirements designed to protect the constitutional
rights of minor defendants (Ullman, 2000). Although
this was not the express intent of these reforms,
juvenile proceedings now began to resemble
traditional adversarial adult felony proceedings, and
punishment-oriented strategies progressively
replaced original treatment objectives (Grisso, 2003).
In the Kent and Gault decisions of the mid-
1960s, we see the seeds of what eventually became
a significant shift in focus onto punitive measures in
the juvenile courts. In the U.S., when the rate of
adolescents’ violent offenses sharply increased in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (Snyder et al., 1996), this
merely served to reinforce the suspicion that was
voiced 20 years earlier; namely, that a rehabilitative
system of justice for juveniles was not viable, and
that a more punitive system was necessary. In
response to this surge of juvenile violence, virtually
all U.S. states changed their statutes as to de-
emphasize rehabilitative responses and increase the
likelihood and severity of punishment (Grisso, 2003).
In Canada, a similar shift could be witnessed with
the enactment of the YOA in 1984. Specifically, the
exclusive focus on treatment and rehabilitation that
had characterized the JDA was replaced with the
“Declaration of Principle” in section 3 of the YOA
which demanded, among other things, that attention
be paid to criminal responsibility, protection of
society, and the legal rights and freedoms of minor
defendants (Stuart, 1989). Mirroring the transition
that was taking place within the American system,
the YOA focused on public safety, culpability, and
demonstrated an increased awareness of the legal
rights to which young defendants were entitled. Bill
C-58, which was passed in December of 1989 as an
amendment to the YOA, further reinforced the
premium put on protecting the public from young
offenders. Specifically, the bill stipulated that “the
protection of the public shall be paramount” in
guiding transfer decisions (Bala, 1990).
At the same time, however, Bill C-58 increased
the maximum disposition that the youth court could
impose for murder, signaling Parliament’s desire that
not all murder cases be automatically transferred to
criminal court. By allowing the juvenile system to
retain custody over some violent offenders, this was
an attempt to simultaneously meet the treatment
needs of these youth while ensuring the protection
of society (Bala, 1990). This, in fact, was a
recognition that some youths—even those who
commit acts of extreme violence—could be
rehabilitated if they had longer periods of time within
the youth system (Bala, 1990). Nevertheless, if the
objectives of public protection and rehabilitation
could not be reconciled within the bounds of the
juvenile system, public safety would prevail.
The most recent phase of Canadian juvenile
justice came into effect in April of 2003 with the
enactment of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).
Under this new act, protection of society and
retribution override treatment needs if these two
competing objectives cannot be reconciled. Compar-
able to the goals of the U.S. system, the YCJA has
as its sentencing purpose “to hold a young person
accountable for an offense through the imposition
of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences
for the young person and that promote his or her
rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby
contributing to the long-term protection of the
public” (s. 38 [1]). Although this statement attempts
to weave together competing demands of punish-
ment, rehabilitation, and public safety, it also implies
that culpability and societal protection will take
precedence over a youth’s treatment needs. The
YCJA’s punitive flavor is also evident in the concept
it employs for transfer decisions; in contrast to both
the JDA and YOA, under the YCJA the transfer
decision is framed entirely in terms of criminal
responsibility and protecting the community. The Act
essentially seeks to determine whether a juvenile
sanction could sufficiently hold a youth “accoun-
table” for his or her offense (Bromwich, 2002).
Interestingly, however, portions of YCJA remain
similar to Bill C-58 in that they allow for “intensive
rehabilitative custody” orders to be made in cases
where a youth has committed a violent offense (i.e.,
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or
aggravated sexual assault), but is suffering from a
“mental illness or disorder, a psychological disorder,
or an emotional disturbance” (s. 42 [7][b]).
Therefore, despite the “get tough” quality of the
YCJA, rehabilitation continues to occupy a place in
the Act.
Presently, public safety has effectively come to
replace rehabilitation as the juvenile court’s top
priority, and transfer proceedings reflect these
changing priorities. In direct contrast to the criteria
guiding adjudication during the rehabilitative phase
of juvenile justice, large numbers of delinquent youth
are currently transferred “wholesale” and sentenced
on the basis of their offenses and prior record, rather
than according to their unique developmental needs
(Feld, 2000). Mulford and colleagues (2004) note
that modifications and expansions to statutory
exclusion provisions in the U.S. (i.e., where youths
can be waived automatically based on their age and/
or offense committed) represent “the fastest growing
mechanisms for transferring youth out of the juvenile
system” (p. 10). Overall, the increase in mechanisms
available for transfer, coupled with the socio-political
climate in which these reforms have been taking
place, have served to substantially boost the rates of
juvenile cases transferred to adult court over the past
two decades (Butts, 1997; Grisso, 1998; Salekin,
2002b).
TRANSFER MECHANISMS: HOW YOUNG
OFFENDERS GET TO ADULT COURT
As the above discussion illustrates, the juvenile
justice system has had the unenviable task of
reconciling the opposing demands of punishment and
rehabilitation for much of its history. The practical
result of these conflicting factions on the juvenile
system is embodied in waiver proceedings (Ullman,
2000); the transfer of juveniles to criminal court
essentially emerged as a “safety valve” designed to
deal with the competing demands of punishment and
rehabilitation that were increasingly being faced by
the juvenile system. Although juvenile transfers have
since become exceedingly complex legal procedures,
arguably, transfers still fundamentally represent a
punitive response to young offenders who are
deemed “inappropriate” for the juvenile justice
system (Feld, 2000).
In practice, the mechanisms through which a
youth can be waived into the criminal system are
elaborate and vary across different geographical
regions. In the U.S., because criminal law is
legislated at both the state and federal level, this has
resulted in over 50 different legal codes for juveniles.
In contrast, Canadian criminal justice systems are
bound by national criminal code legislation, and
therefore evidence more consistency across
provinces (Ruddell et al., 1998). Most states have a
variety of transfer provisions dictating the exact
processes through which a youth can be transferred
to adult court. In Arizona, Georgia, and Pennsylvania,
for instance, a youth may be waived to adult court
via three separate transfer mechanisms (i.e., judicial
waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and statutory exclu-
sion). The latter two provisions allow for a youth to
be waived automatically on the basis of age or type
of offense committed, while the former includes a
traditional hearing and judgment. In Canada, there
exist no provisions that allow a youth to be waived
automatically into the adult system. At a minimum,
an “application” for adult sentencing must be made
and formally decided upon during a hearing (YCJA,
2003, s. 64[1], 71). Finally, 23 American states have
the option of waiving a youth back to juvenile court
for disposition and/or sentencing purposes—
procedures referred to as “reverse waiver” and
“blended sentencing” (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999).
Although no parallel options exist under the YCJA,
there is increased discretion surrounding the Crown’s
ability to “renounce” an application for adult
sentencing on the basis that a youth has committed
a presumptive offense (i.e., first or second degree
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated
sexual assault, or the third commission of a “serious
violent offense” as defined in section 2 of the YCJA;
Bromwich, 2002). Additionally, a youth is permitted
to serve the first portion of an adult sentence in a
juvenile facility (up until age 20) if “the young person
is under the age of eighteen years at the time that he
or she is sentenced” (YCJA, 2003, s. 76 [2][a]).
Perhaps the most salient of the regional
differences that exist in American transfer provisions
is the age at which a youth can be considered for
transfer; in Kansas and Vermont, for example, a child
as young as 10 years of age can be considered for
judicial waiver. Other states do not indicate a
minimum age, and instead specify different ages
depending on the type of offense committed, with
more serious offenses typically having a lower
minimum age for transfer (Snyder & Sickmund,
1999). In contrast, Canadian law stipulates that all
youths aged 14 or older may be sentenced in criminal
court if they have committed any presumptive
offense, or any offense for which an adult would
receive a sentence of two years or longer (YCJA,
2003, s. 62). Each province retains discretion,
however, to set the exact age (above 14 but no more
than 16 years of age) at which this presumption will
apply (YCJA, 2003, s. 61). Once this age is reached,
adult liability is presumed, and the onus is upon the
accused to demonstrate why they should be
sentenced as a juvenile.
EFFICACY AND ETHICS: DO TRANSFERS
WORK?
Behind this deceptively simple question lie a
myriad of issues and controversies. From a legal
policy-making perspective, transfers are considered
efficacious if they can be shown to reduce rates of
youth crime. To date, the evidence has been equi-
vocal in demonstrating that punitive reforms reduce
crime rates or control violent delinquency among
youth (Forst & Blomquist, 1991; Sheffer, 1995). For
transfer laws in particular, there is evidence both to
support and oppose the proposition that increasing
transfer rates has had an appreciable effect on
juvenile crime rates or perceptions of public safety.
Bishop and colleagues (Bishop, Frazier, Lanza-
Kaduce, & Winner, 1996; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce,
Bishop, & Frazier, 1997) empirically examined the
effects of transfer and found that youths who were
waived to adult court typically re-offended at faster
rates compared to matched controls in the juvenile
system. Furthermore, while transfers were associated
with diminished recidivism rates for property
offenses, this decrease was offset by increased rates
of violent re-offending (e.g., assault and robbery;
Bishop et al., 1996). Similar findings showing faster
recidivism rates among transferred youth have been
reported by other researchers (e.g., Fagan, 1996;
Myers, 2001; Podkopacz & Feld, 1996). Together,
these results suggest that transfers are ineffective in
reducing juvenile crime and isolating youths who
pose the gravest threat to public safety.
Data from official juvenile justice agencies
present a different perspective. Statistics tracing
juvenile crime rates in the United States show a clear
parallel between rising crime rates in the early 1990s
and increases in the proportions of cases waived to
adult court. Importantly, these data also show a
corresponding drop in the number of cases trans-
ferred to criminal court when the rate of juvenile
offending began to decrease after peaking in 1994.
The actual number of cases judicially waived to
criminal court in the U.S. peaked in 1994 at over
12,000 cases (Puzzanchera, Stahl, Finnegan, Tierney,
& Snyder, 2003; Ruddell et al., 1998), representing
a 45% increase from just four years earlier.
Subsequently, there was a 38% decline in cases
transferred to adult court between 1994 and 1998
(Puzzanchera et al., 2003), occurring simultaneously
with a 47% decline in the juvenile arrest rate for
Violent Crime Index offenses (Snyder, 2004). While
these trends are not necessarily causally linked, it is
possible that the substantial increase in transfer rates
occurring in the mid-1990s served as a deterrent to
juvenile crime which declined over the next eight
years. However, it is equally possible that those
youths who were transferred and went on to re-offend
had crossed the age of majority, effectively excluding
their new offenses from juvenile crime statistics.
In addition to questioning whether transfers
serve as effective deterrents, researchers have
debated whether transfers aid in protecting the public
or increasing perceptions of public safety. Waivers
are currently requested for all types of offenses and
offenders, whereas they were once reserved for the
most violent or recalcitrant delinquents. For instance,
American youths charged with property offenses in
1999 comprised a greater share of the waived
caseload than those charged with person or violent
offenses (40% or 3,000 cases for property crimes
compared to 34% or 2,500 cases for person offenses;
Stahl, 2003). This was especially true for Caucasian
youths charged with property offenses; these youth
comprised the largest share (48%) of the waived
caseload, compared to 31% charged with offenses
against persons (Puzzanchera et al., 2003). Similarly,
roughly equal numbers of Canadian youth were
transferred to adult court for violent (56%) and non-
violent (44%) offenses over a nine-year period
spanning from 1986 to 1994 (Ruddell et al., 1998).
Similar to the message conveyed by Bishop and
colleagues’ research (1996, 1997), these data suggest
that transfers may not be effective in identifying and
isolating only those young offenders that threaten
public safety.
From an ethical stance, the issue of “effec-
tiveness” becomes more complex; reducing the level
of crime among juveniles does not necessarily imply
that transfers are ethically or morally acceptable to
society. At a minimum, as a society we have an
obligation to demonstrate that transfers incur no
additional risks or excessive harm to a youth who
may remain within the bounds of the juvenile system.
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research
examining the long-term outcomes of transferred
youth, and the consequences of differential
placement (i.e., juvenile versus adult system;
Weatherly, 1990). Some research suggests that there
may be unintended negative consequences of
waiving youths into the criminal system. For
instance, juveniles who are transferred to adult status
often receive harsher sentences than do adults
charged for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction
(Myers, 2003; Strom, Smith, & Snyder, 1998;
Ullman, 2000). Criminal courts now also incarcerate
youth at higher percentages than does the juvenile
system (Podkopacz, 1996), although this was not
always the case (Bortner, 1986; Hamparian et al.,
1982). In the U.S., juvenile felony defendants in
criminal court are more likely than adult defendants
to be detained at pretrial, convicted, and sentenced
to a state prison (Strom et al., 1998). In contrast,
some juveniles—most notably those with lengthy
youth records—tried in adult court obtain “first-time
offender” status and consequently receive more
lenient sanctions than they would have in the juvenile
system (Jaffe, 1985; Kruh & Brodsky, 1997). Still,
some evidence has found the opposite (e.g., Rudman,
Harstone, Fagan, & Moore, 1986). Thus detrimental
effects occur in some cases and preferential effects
in others; however, one certain effect is that waiving
a youth to adult court introduces the possibility of
more serious legal sanctions, including the death
penalty in 21 American states (Ruddell et al., 1998;
Steinberg & Scott, 2003).
In terms of the behavioral and psychological
ramifications of transfer, again, there is a lack of
conclusive knowledge surrounding the short- and
long-term effects of the criminal system on young
offenders (Redding, 2003). The literature that does
exist highlights the inadequacies of the adult system
in terms of rehabilitation and skill development in
youth. In particular, the detrimental effects of
exposing adolescents to “prison life” while they are
in the process of learning social and cognitive skills
are highlighted (Forst, Fagan, & Vivona, 1989).
Rather than developing valuable skills and prosocial
bonds to others, Forst and colleagues (1989) suggest
that “these youth will know little else other than the
institutional world … the social rules and norms
learned are those in the institution, including the
reciprocal cycle of victimization and retaliation” (p.
11). Furthermore, adjusting “successfully” to prison
life may produce added criminogenic effects, and
paradoxically make it more difficult for these youth
to re-integrate themselves into the community once
they are released (Redding, 2003).
Taken as a whole, it is doubtful that the gains or
benefits of juvenile transfer (e.g., in the form of
reduced crime rates or increased perceptions of
public safety) outweigh the harm or risks incurred
by the process. But if as a society we wish to maintain
the practice of juvenile transfers, we should at the
very least demonstrate that the criteria used in waiver
hearings possess adequate reliability and validity, and
we should be clear about limitations. What evidence
is there that important characteristics such as
dangerousness, amenability to rehabilitation, and
sophistication-maturity can be accurately assessed
in youth? We turn to this issue in the next section of
this paper.
DANGEROUSNESS, AMENABILITY, &
SOPHISTICATION-MATURITY ASSESSMENTS
IN THE JUVENILE COURT
Most transfer decisions are based on a youth
court judge’s assessment of dangerousness, amena-
bility to treatment, and the level of maturity exhibited
by a youth (Grisso, 2000, 2003; Kruh & Brodsky,
1997; Salekin, 2002a). Except for those types of
transfers where a youth is waived to adult court
automatically based on his or her age and the type
of offense committed (i.e., statutory/legislative
offense exclusion and prosecutorial/“direct file”
waivers), expertise from the fields of developmental,
clinical, and forensic psychology is almost always
relied upon to inform these evaluations (Ewing,
1990; Grisso, 2000, 2003; Kruh & Brodsky, 1997).
As transfers are becoming increasingly streamlined
into the juvenile justice system, it is no longer
sufficient for a clinician to evaluate a youth’s
rehabilitative needs. Rather, forensic evaluators now
need to collect evidence reflecting a youth’s
culpability and risk for future violence, and to
directly address the “public safety” standard in
waiver hearings (Grisso, 2003). Interestingly, the
legal constructs of dangerousness, amenability to
treatment, and sophistication-maturity remain the
determinative factors in most transfer hearings
despite the ambiguity and lack of systematic
guidelines existing for their assessment (Salekin,
2002a).
What Factors Impede the Prediction of
Dangerousness in Youth?
Youths typically cannot be waived to criminal
court unless they pose a serious risk of harm to others.
A clinician in this situation thus seeks to make an
estimate of the likelihood that a particular youth will
engage in violent behavior at some point in the future
(Grisso, 2000). There are several problems with these
evaluations, many of which are compounded by the
fact that risk assessments are used to make
consequential decisions in forensic contexts (Grisso,
1998; Salekin, Rogers, & Ustad, 2001). First, given
the fact that estimating future violence in adult
offenders is difficult and often unreliable, one might
well anticipate that such a task would become
prohibitively difficult in adolescents, who are in the
period of rapid social, behavioral and emotional
transition. In contrast to adults, whose characteristics
tend to be more stable over time, adolescence is
characterized by considerable developmental
change. This implies that a clinician’s estimate of
future behavior will be compromised by the fact that
information about a youth’s current characteristics,
collected at one point in time, quickly become dated
as the youth continues to develop and mature (Grisso,
2000; Mash & Barkley, 1996).
A second factor impeding clinicians’ abilities to
provide the courts with a reliable estimate of future
violence is the fact that antisocial behavior increases
during adolescence, even in normative populations,
and this increase is typically transient (Moffitt, 1993).
It is a well-validated finding that the majority of
youth desist from criminal activities once they reach
19 or 20 years of age (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990;
Moffitt, 1993). This has also been demonstrated for
youths who commit violent offenses (Elliott,
Huizinga, & Morse, 1986). Although Moffitt (1993)
posits that there exists a small group of young
offenders whose criminality persists into adulthood
(i.e., “life course persistent”), these youth are clearly
the minority. The normative increase in antisocial
behavior during adolescence makes it extremely
difficult to isolate predictors that that reliably
distinguish those youth who will continue to engage
in antisocial behavior from those who will not
(Grisso, 1998). Although several well-validated risk
factors have been identified in the literature with
modest relationships to future violence (e.g., Borum,
2000; Loeber & Farrington, 1998), research has been
slow to translate these findings into explicit
guidelines for forensic clinicians (Grisso, 2000,
2003). To compound this dilemma, many risk
assessment instruments have been criticized on the
basis that they are not sufficiently sensitive to
dynamic factors that change over time (Borum,
2000). Given that adolescence is a period charac-
terized by change, this poses a significant challenge
for these instruments’ ability to gage the temporal
stability (or instability) of risk in juveniles.
What about the prediction of more serious forms
of offending? One might argue that antisocial
behavior is difficult to predict over the long term
because it increases in adolescence, but violent
behavior is relatively rare and certainly more
concerning in terms of public safety. While this is
true, the problem in predicting violent behavior is
that the base rate is so low. Legal decisions that are
based on a judgment of “high risk” for violence
presume that clinicians and judges have the capacity
to predict low base-rate, serious, and violent criminal
behavior in a reliable fashion (Feld, 2000). In reality,
however, the prediction of any low base-rate
behavior, in any type of population, will produce a
substantial false-positive error rate (Grisso, 1998,
2003; Monahan, 1981). In the context of waiver
hearings, basing a decision to transfer a young person
on an estimate of his or her propensity for future
violence ignores the possibility that such estimates
can be wrong just as often as they are right, and that
this is especially true when worded in dichotomous
language (i.e., that a youth will or will not be violent
in the future; Ewing, 1985; Monahan, 1981). In
particular, due to the number of false-positive errors
that will arise when estimating future violence, to
incarcerate a youth on the basis of what they may do
in the future may not be justifiable (Zimring &
Hawkins, 1995).
The developmental changes that occur during
adolescence imply that risk predictions—particularly
long-term estimates of future violence—may be
unreliable to the point of being contraindicated in
youth. In fact, long-range estimates of risk for
violence (i.e., more than two or three years) are
almost uniformly discouraged by the scientific
literature (Melton et al., 1997; Monahan, 1981).
Some might argue that the courts do not explicitly
ask for long-term predictions; in practice, however,
juvenile waiver hearings typically require clinicians
to supply an opinion about a youth’s state when they
are released from the juvenile system (Grisso, 1998).
As such, the temporal range of these opinions will
depend on the age of the youth at the time of the
hearing, with younger offenders usually requiring
longer-range estimates. Ironically, it is these younger
offenders for whom long-range predictions will be
most problematic. It could also be argued that some
information is better than none, and that court
personnel can understand and use clinical assessment
information to the benefit of youth. This is true:
information on the youth’s cognitive functioning,
social and family background and history of violent
behavior can be extremely useful in court. However,
long-term estimates of risk for future dangerousness
are another matter because these go far beyond this
data and their accuracy is not substantiated.
Due to the limitations inherent in violence risk
assessments, and particularly in juvenile assess-
ments, such evaluations have been discouraged in
the literature until quite recently (Barnum, 1987;
Ewing, 1990). Currently, with the substantial
advances that have been made in the field of violence
risk prediction, clinicians appear to be better
positioned in making more accurate estimates in a
variety of populations (Salekin, 2002a). For instance,
it is now acknowledged that risk for violence must
be estimated along a continuum of probabilities to
improve accuracy (Salekin, 2002a). In addition,
research in the field suggests combining actuarial
and clinical models of prediction in order to increase
reliability in the face of low base-rate behaviors such
as violence (Monahan, 1982). Creating well-defined,
proximal time lines for prediction has been shown
to significantly increase the accuracy of violence risk
estimates (Salekin, 2002a), as has specifying a
precise environment in which violence is most likely
to take place (Kruh & Brodsky, 1997). Lastly,
psychologists performing risk evaluations with
adolescents can aim to identify those factors that
Moffitt (1993) and others have identified as signaling
persistent offending (e.g., early onset of severe,
varied, and frequent offending, maturity of character)
to enhance the validity of their assessments. Overall,
because the judgments supplied by psychologists
regarding risk and dangerousness are often taken as
“near ultimate” opinions, and because this informa-
tion is frequently used in making placement and
sentencing decisions, psychologists bear the
responsibility to ensure that the information provided
is of the highest validity and is not interpreted out of
context.
Can we Assess Amenability to Intervention?
In order to deal with the challenges inherent in
juvenile risk assessments, an evaluator’s judgment
about future violence will typically reflect the degree
to which he or she thinks rehabilitative efforts will
be successful with a particular youth (Grisso, 1998).
In addition to the “public safety” standard, youth may
be waived to criminal court if they are found to be
unamenable to rehabilitation within the resources
available to the court and within the period of time
the system has custody of the youth. When assessing
amenability, an evaluator will often consider factors
that have been shown to promote change in
psychotherapy more generally: the capacity to form
attachments to caregivers, the degree of psycho-
logical discomfort and/or motivation to change
exhibited by the youth, as well as the chronicity of
the condition that must be modified (Grisso, 1998,
2000). Youths who are deemed unamenable to
treatment are, in effect, being deemed “prematurely
mature” in the sense that the rehabilitative objectives
of juvenile system can no longer be of use to them
(Grisso, 1998).
As is true for risk assessments, rehabilitation
evaluations are beset by limitations of which
clinicians must be cognizant. First, the legal
definition of amenability is considerably narrow. In
contrast to a developmental perspective, where
amenability refers broadly to the extent to which a
youth’s character has the potential to change, the
legal system determines “amenability to treatment”
by the type and quality of interventions that are
available, as well as the amount of time that the youth
can legally remain in the system. This being said, a
clinician should be careful not to equate past
treatment failures with a general inability to respond
to intervention. Past failures may have been the result
of poor quality interventions, or a poor match
between the developmental needs of a particular
youth and the interventions that were available at
the time (Grisso, 2000).
A second factor that may limit the validity of an
amenability assessment has to do with the functions
of the juvenile court more generally. Historically, one
of the major purposes of the youth court has been to
provide treatment; consequently, a surefire way to
have a juvenile considered for waiver would be to
identify this youth as “untreatable.” As the meaning
of the term “amenable” is ambiguous, it has become
easier to apply a label of “nonamenable” whenever
a certain result (e.g., waiver) must be attained. As
Fagan and Zimring (2000) have pointed out, in
contexts where there is strong societal pressure to
have a youth tried and sentenced in criminal court,
“everything can be grist for the theoretical mill of
finding a youth not amenable to treatment…the
motives that have produced the decision to transfer
a youth [are made] well before the nonamenability
label is pasted on the defendant” (pp. 5-6). In these
contexts, a clinician must be especially mindful of
bias resulting from strong public or political
pressures.
What About Sophistication-Maturity
Assessments?
In contrast to risk and amenability evaluations,
where clinicians must be especially sensitive to
various limitations and caveats, sophistication-
maturity assessments can be conducted with a fair
degree of confidence, and this is one domain where
forensic clinicians potentially have the most valuable
information for the courts (Ewing, 1990; Kruh &
Brodsky, 1997). Clinical psychologists have many
tools that enable them to reliably and validly assess
cognitive and emotional development in adolescents.
For example, cognitive testing can be carried out with
the Wechsler intelligence scales (WISC-IV, WAIS-
III)—scales that are useful for assessing a range of
factors such as perception, cognitive processing,
attention, and judgment. Other types of intelligence
such as Sternberg’s (2000) triad (i.e., prosocial,
asocial, and antisocial) are also important to assess
in “street smart” youth that may score low on
conventional measures of intelligence. Scholastic
achievement tests exist that can assess for the
presence of learning disabilities or neurological
dysfunction (e.g., Wide Range Achievement Test),
and socio-emotional maturity can be measured using
semi-structured clinical interviews and self-report
measures of personality functioning (e.g., Millon
Adolescent Clinical Inventory, Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory—Adolescent version).
Experts in the area also recommend considering a
youth’s level of moral development, and whether or
not this matches his or her behavior (Salekin, 2002b).
A crucial element in the legal notion of
sophistication-maturity is competency; by way of
cognitive and socio-emotional maturity, clinicians
are essentially trying to determine a juvenile’s ability
to understand and appreciate the nature of his or her
behavior, and to participate in legal proceedings
(Kruh & Brodsky, 1997). Ewing (1990) elucidated
the relationship between the psychological concept
of maturity and the legal notion of accountability
when he noted, “what lies behind such concern over
maturity and sophistication is society’s long-standing
notion that adult penal sanctions should be reserved
for those mature enough to be held fully responsible
for their crimes” (p. 7). To this end, it has been
suggested that clinicians borrow from the tools used
in adult competency evaluations (e.g., assessments
of Mental State at the Time of the Offense,
Competence to Stand Trial), and attempt to identify
any significant obstacles that may have prevented
the youth from recognizing the wrongfulness of his
or her behavior at the time of the offense (Kruh &
Brodsky, 1997). While “obstacles” typically refer to
major psychiatric illnesses in adult offenders, there
is growing recognition that youths in criminal court
may be incompetent or not criminally responsible
because of developmental immaturity (Bonnie &
Grisso, 2000; Mulford et al., 2004, Redding & Frost,
2002; Viljoen, Vincent, & Roesch, in press).
The importance of assessing sophistication-
maturity in transfer hearings is underscored by the
fact that more juveniles than adults would be found
incompetent and/or not sufficiently mature to bear
full criminal responsibility if these evaluations were
conducted on a regular basis (Salekin, Yff, Neumann,
Leistico, & Zalot, 2002). Empirical research
speaking to this claim has demonstrated that young
adolescents, when compared to either older
adolescents or adults, exhibit significant differences
in their ability to make decisions, consider the risks
and benefits associated with a decision, evaluate
consequences, and act autonomously (Cauffman &
Steinberg, 2000; Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman,
2001). When adolescents can be shown to possess
adult-level cognitive capacities, their decisions still
differ from those of adults due to “psychosocial
immaturity”—factors such as susceptibility to peer
influence, perceptions of future risk, and the capacity
for self-management that directly affect decision-
making outcomes (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000;
Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995). With respect to
those capacities directly relevant to legal pro-
ceedings, it has been shown that juveniles are often
lacking in the abilities to competently stand trial (e.g.,
comprehension of courtroom procedures, recognition
of information relevant to a legal defense, and the
ability to process information for legal decision
making; Grisso et al., 2003).
It is relevant to note that in all of the above
mentioned studies, investigators failed to find
significant differences between older adolescents and
adults. Furthermore, research by Cauffman and
colleagues (e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000;
Halpern-Felsher & Cauffman, 2001) continues to
stress the considerable individual differences that
exist within defined age brackets, and the incon-
sistency of adult-adolescent differences in decision-
making abilities. Therefore, it remains crucial to
assess competency and maturity in young offenders
on a case-by-case basis, and to be mindful of those
factors that may mitigate a young person’s legal
competency and culpability. These findings also
highlight the ethical obligation clinicians have to
ensure that youths being considered for transfer are
competent and sufficiently mature to enter into the
adult criminal system. This responsibility becomes
particularly important considering that no cor-
responding legal obligation exists to establish
competency in juveniles facing transfer (with the
exception of statutes in Virginia and the District of
Columbia; Redding & Frost, 2002).
JUVENILE PSYCHOPATHY AND TRANSFER
CRITERIA
In both Canada and the U.S., psychopathy acts
as an aggravating factor during sentencing in adult
court. Psychopathy is of special interest to judges
mainly because of its association with violent
recidivism, in addition to the idea that psychopaths
are notoriously difficult to treat. It is easy to
appreciate, therefore, that when mental health
professionals testify about the relationship between
psychopathy, future violence, and failed treatment,
this offers judges a hard-to-resist justification for
imposing harsher dispositions on these offenders
(Zinger & Forth, 1998). In Canada, psychopathy has
been used on two occasions to help justify life
sentences in adult cases (R. v. Lyver, 1983; R. v.
White, 1986). The significant and detrimental weight
that psychopathy assessments carry in the adult
courtroom is evident, and it would be naïve to think
that the burgeoning research on psychopathy in
children and adolescents may not lead to similar
outcomes in juvenile courts (Vincent & Hart, 2002).
Psychopathy has in fact been introduced in
juvenile hearings on several occasions, and has been
used by the courts, along with a diagnosis of
Antisocial Personality Disorder, to justify the transfer
of young persons to adult court (e.g., R. v. G.J.M.,
1992; R. v. G.R., 1994). Because psychopathy is
closely related to those criteria that typically need to
be addressed in waiver hearings (i.e., dangerousness,
amenability to treatment, and maturity of character),
this is perhaps what led Seagrave and Grisso (2002)
to opine that juvenile psychopathy measures would
soon “become one of the most frequently used
instruments in forensic assessments of delinquency
cases of any kind” (p. 220). However, they also
warned that “psychopathy assessment must achieve
a high level of confidence before it is employed in
the juvenile justice system” (p. 219) and remarked
that this level of confidence has not yet been attained.
Potential for misusing psychopathy in juvenile
proceedings stems from the fact that the literature
on adolescent psychopathy does not currently
support its use in forensic decision-making contexts
(Edens, Skeem, Cruise, & Cauffman, 2001; Frick,
2002; Odgers, Moretti, & Reppucci, 2005; Vincent
& Hart, 2002). To date, there is insufficient evidence
to elucidate whether the construct of psychopathy
behaves comparably in youth as it does in adults;
specifically, whether it predicts resistance to
treatment and future violence in a similar manner as
it does in adult populations (Vincent & Hart, 2002).
In terms of amenability to rehabilitation, there is a
growing recognition that the literature on the
treatment of adult psychopaths is inconclusive at best
(Andrews & Bonta, 1994; Meloy, 1995). It would
be difficult to explain, therefore, why youths who
are generally considered to be more malleable than
adults would be any more difficult to rehabilitate.
Also lacking is any strong or direct evidence that
measures of juvenile psychopathy are tapping the
same construct as are their corresponding adult
instruments, namely, a stable personality disorder
that does not dissipate over time (Harpur & Hare,
1994; Vincent & Hart, 2002). It has been noted by
some experts in the field (e.g., Edens et al., 2001;
Seagrave & Grisso, 2002) that existing measures of
psychopathic traits in children and adolescents (e.g.,
the Psychopathy Checklist, Youth Version; Forth,
Kosson, & Hare, 2003, the Child Psychopathy Scale;
Lynam, 1997, the Antisocial Process Screening
Device; Frick & Hare, 2001) contain items that
reflect normative fluctuations in emotional,
psychosocial and behavioral development, and that
are age-inappropriate markers for psychopathy
among youth. Given that adolescence is a time of
rapid development and maturational change, a
demonstration of the predictive capacity and
temporal stability of psychopathic traits in youth
becomes especially crucial in evaluating the
construct validity of “juvenile psychopathy” and
justifying its use in forensic contexts (Edens et al.,
2001). The use of psychopathy assessments for girls
is particularly concerning (Odgers et al., 2005), given
the lack of sound research assessing the concurrent
or predictive relation of psychopathy to aggression
among girls, and limited research on psychopathy
in women.
In contrast to adult offenders, the robust
relationship that exists between psychopathy and
future violence has simply not been replicated in
youth to the same degree (Edens et al., 2001;
Seagrave & Grisso, 2002). Those studies that appear
to support the predictive validity of psychopathic
traits in youth (e.g., Gretton, Hare, & Catchpole,
2004; Kosson, Cyterski, Steuerwald, Neumann, &
Walker-Matthews, 2002) are limited by the fact that
none examine the predictive relationships between
psychopathy and future violence separately for the
different factors purported to underpin the larger
construct (i.e., the interpersonal, affective, and
behavioral features of psychopathy). Virtually no
prospective studies have tested the predictive utility
of psychopathic personality traits that are believed
to lie at the “core” of the adult syndrome (Blackburn,
1998; Cleckley, 1941) in child or adolescent samples
(see Frick, Kimonis, Dandreaux, & Farell, 2003 for
an exception). Consequently, it remains unclear
whether there is anything about psychopathy per se,
above and beyond the antisocial and criminal
behaviors, that predicts future violence and
offending. Of note, in a recent study by Corrado and
colleagues (2004), it was shown that the bulk of
predictive power of the PCL:YV stems from the
impulsive and stimulation-seeking behavioral traits
that are shared with most disruptive behavior
disorders in youth. In light of current debates
regarding the appropriateness of assessing psycho-
pathic traits in adolescents, as well as the construct’s
potential for diagnostic misuse, it may be the case
that psychopathic personality traits offer little
incremental value in terms of prediction, and that
assessing common behavioral disorders (e.g.,
conduct disorder, oppositional defiant disorder) more
directly forecasts short-term future violence.
Although research attesting to the stability of
psychopathic traits in adolescents has proliferated
in the past few years (e.g., Corrado, Vincent, Hart,
& Cohen, 2004; Frick et al., 2003; Gretton, McBride,
Hare, O’Shaughnessy, & Kumka, 2001), many of
these studies continue to be beset by various
limitations (e.g., short follow-up periods, basing
psychopathy ratings on self- or parent-report, or on
file information only). However, perhaps the most
significant, and undoubtedly most pernicious,
limitation with regards to research assessing the
stability of juvenile psychopathy lies in the theory
and measurement of the actual construct. Cleckley’s
(1941) original theoretical vision of psychopathy
implied that it was a persistent and life-long
“condition”; as such, the measures that have since
been developed to assess psychopathy in various
populations have assumed stability. A major
consequence of this assumption is that the construct,
in addition to our current instruments for assessing
it, are largely insensitive to change. To be specific,
it is next to impossible to extract an estimate of
change when the assessment of psychopathy relies
on making ratings based on lifetime behavior. It may,
therefore, be both artificial and theoretically unsound
to study the reliability of psychopathic traits at two
points in time unless the assessment procedure is
radically adjusted to provide independent estimates
of psychopathy in within each interval. This dilemma
must be borne in mind when evaluating recent
research attesting to the “stability” (or “instability”)
of psychopathic traits in youth. It is possible that
these studies are simply assessing what is equivalent
to inter-rater reliability because the data at each point
of measurement is largely redundant.
Overall, in the absence of firm longitudinal
research attesting to the temporal stability and
predictive utility of psychopathic traits in youth,
reliance on psychopathy measures to make decisions
regarding transfers or long-term placements for
juveniles is contraindicated until there is clear and
substantive data attesting to validity and reliability.
These instruments will likely produce substantial
false-positive error rates, and will not accurately
identify that subgroup of antisocial youth who may
continue to engage in violent behavior throughout
the course of their lives (Edens et al., 2001; Forth &
Burke, 1998). As Seagrave and Grisso (2002) have
cautioned, it is ethically unacceptable to introduce
instruments with significant false-positive rates into
forensic contexts where weighty legal decisions are
to be made. This is not to imply that research on the
PCL:YV and other measures of psychopathy should
not continue; indeed, there is much value in moving
forward in our investigation of measures and the
construct of psychopathy to better understand its
developmental precursors and consequences.
However, at this time, the literature offers little
empirical foundation for the use of psychopathy in
decision-making contexts to inform predictions of
future violence or treatment amenability in youth.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Juvenile courts continue to face a classic
dilemma: that of balancing the care of youth with
public demands for protection and retribution. Youth
violent crime and aggressive behavior is a serious
problem but transfers to adult court offer little in the
way of an effective solution. Despite this, transfers
have increasingly become an accepted method of
dealing with serious young offenders, while
treatment and rehabilitation efforts have faded as
priorities within juvenile justice policy. How does
our growing knowledge of child and adolescent
development bear on recommendations for policy
and practice related to transfer decisions?
First, and perhaps most importantly, we argue
that transfer decisions should return to being made
exclusively on an individualized, case-by-case basis.
As the juvenile courts have moved towards offense-
based sentencing and away from tailored, offender-
based adjudication, disproportionate numbers of
youth are transferred “wholesale” on the basis of their
age, current offense, or prior record. We urge that
this trend be slowed or halted altogether, particularly
because failing to do so risks overshadowing unique
developmental factors that could significantly impact
the suitability of transfer for a given youth. For
instance, factors such as psychosocial immaturity can
substantially influence a youth’s level of competency
and criminal responsibility; therefore, it is imperative
that these factors be evaluated and brought to light
before a decision to transfer is made. More generally,
we argue for a return to individualized assessments
as they will most likely encourage juvenile court
judges to think critically about the needs of specific
youths, and to determine the most appropriate
combination of rehabilitative- and punitive-oriented
dispositions on a case-by-case basis. Undoubtedly,
transfers to criminal court will continue to represent
a significant part of juvenile justice policy and law;
we would, however, recommend that transfer
decisions become more selective, and that they be
reserved for the most serious, chronic, and violent
offenders.
Second, in order to make psychological
assessments most useful to the courts, we must
increase the accuracy and reliability through which
youths who stand to be waived into the adult system
are evaluated. Currently, transfer provisions lack a
systematic guiding principle by which serious young
offenders are identified and transferred to adult court.
In particular, the legal constructs guiding transfer
decisions (i.e., dangerousness, amenability to
treatment, and sophistication) continue to be fairly
ambiguous and difficult to assess in developing
youth. It is of utmost importance that future research
seek to clarify these constructs and offer clinicians
explicit and systematic guidelines for their assess-
ment in adolescent populations. Fortunately, a
handful of instruments designed to evaluate young
offenders have recently been developed (see the Risk,
Sophistication-Maturity, and Treatment Amenability
instrument for a noteworthy example; Leistico &
Salekin, 2003; Salekin, 2004), although these tools
still require more extensive validation and use in the
system at this time. Hopefully, more research of this
type will proliferate in the next few years, thus
enabling clinicians to effectively interpret legal
constructs such as “dangerousness”, “amenability”,
and “sophistication” through a psychological lens
and continue to offer the courts valuable information.
Moving one step beyond this, it seems imperative
that the juvenile courts develop a framework
whereby information on a youth’s risk level,
amenability to intervention, and maturity is
integrated in a meaningful way. For instance, if an
explicit standard were to exist whereby treatment
needs were framed in terms of their risk reduction
value, the courts could perhaps begin moving back
towards a rehabilitation model while still giving due
attention to factors such as public safety and
protection.
Third, program evaluation research needs to be
conducted with renewed vigor in order to help
maintain, develop, and tailor intervention programs
that strive to match a youth’s treatment and
developmental needs. With a variety of high-quality
treatment programs available, there is a greater
likelihood that rates of demonstrated efficacy would
increase, as larger proportions of youth could be
matched to the most suitable intervention initiatives.
This, in turn, would ultimately help minimize the
number of “untreatable” youths being waived into
the adult system because no programs existed at the
juvenile level that could realistically meet their
treatment needs. In light of the fact that, once in the
adult system, virtually no rehabilitative or mental
health services exist, it seems especially critical that
juvenile justice policy be informed about the
necessity of determining the goodness of fit between
juveniles and treatment options, in addition to the
quality of programs available, before a decision about
“unamenability” is made. In reality, however, as the
juvenile courts have moved away from a treatment-
oriented model, fewer resources are directed at
developing and maintaining high quality intervention
programs. Consequently, there is a lesser chance that
these programs will demonstrate effectiveness in
reducing risk levels when (a) they are poorly funded,
and (b) there are few attempts made to produce an
optimal fit between a particular program and a
youth’s specific needs.
Finally, to address the ultimate question of
whether juvenile transfers serve as effective
deterrents to youth crime, and whether they represent
an ethically or morally acceptable practice, it is
necessary to initiate longitudinal research that will
elucidate the long-term effects of juvenile transfer.
With respect to being a deterrent for future crime,
the literature has begun to highlight what seem like
paradoxical effects of juvenile transfers (e.g., in the
form of faster recidivism rates). Moreover, it has been
suggested that a retributive, deterrent-based approach
will generally be less effective with juveniles because
of developmental factors that limit their capacity to
weigh the pros and cons of a situation, and to
anticipate consequences that are far into the future
(such as a lengthy adult sentence). In contrast to the
accumulating body of literature concerned with
recidivism rates for youth tried in adult courts, almost
no research has systematically investigated the
psychological and behavioral ramifications of
transferring a youth into the criminal system. In
particular, due to the paucity of longitudinal research
investigating the adult outcomes of transferred youth
(e.g., in terms of mental and physical health,
reintegration into the community), it is unclear how
these youth are being affected by the process.
Therefore, more research needs to be conducted in
this area primarily to inform the juvenile courts on
the outcomes and possible consequences of transfer.
In conclusion, it is essential that research in the
domain of child and adolescent development
continue to inform and situate itself within juvenile
justice policy. In the current climate of “get tough”
policy reforms and “just desserts” sentencing for
young offenders, it will be a challenge not to lose
sight of the fact that there exist critical developmental
differences between adults and adolescents. In
particular, there is a greater tendency to discount
developmental considerations when the offense
committed is of a more severe or sadistic nature, as
is reflected, for example, in the lowering of minimum
ages for transfer for extremely violent offenses.
These types of reforms are regressive, given the
emerging evidence that rehabilitative efforts are more
likely to be successful with younger children and
that the detrimental effects imposed by the adult
corrections system will likely be greater in very
young and impressionable offenders. In order to
strike a viable balance between seemingly contra-
dictory solutions to youth crime, findings from the
scientific literature must be routinely translated into
explicit standards of practice within the juvenile
system. For example, developing a legal framework
that routinely addresses the possibility of diminished
competency and culpability in young offenders
seems warranted. Similarly, high-quality treatment
outcome research can inform and improve upon
current models of intervention, and may open up new
avenues for formerly “untreatable” youth.
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